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More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism.

This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021.

In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country.

On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001.

Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support.

Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. 

The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.

Supporting the NRF would be a good place to start. This assistance can include:

1. Establishing formal contact with NRF leadership and inviting organization leader Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC.

2. Participating in the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan.

3. Refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

4. Providing the NRF with lethal and nonlethal assistance.

5. Allocating a certain percentage of frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing.

6. Consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnically Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.

A Bleak Situation

Now that the Taliban is in power, the group’s leaders are realizing it was far easier to fight the Afghan government than to govern the country. Fractures at the top of Taliban leadership have made governing even more challenging. This poor governance has caused the worst humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan since the 1990s.

According to a report by the , “more than half of Afghanistan’s population will require humanitarian assistance” in 2024. The same report said that Afghanistan remains in a state of humanitarian crisis characterized by “high levels of protracted displacement, mine and explosive ordnance contamination, restrictions to freedom of movement, increased risk of gender-based violence, child labor, early marriage, and increased needs for mental health and psychosocial support.” Minority ethnic groups—such as Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Hazaras—have faced widespread persecution. Women’s rights have also eroded. Outside limited roles in education and healthcare, women are generally barred from the workplace. Girls are denied an education beyond sixth grade. Under such conditions, the future of millions of Afghans is in doubt.

Additionally, natural disasters have compounded the humanitarian crisis. In the summer of 2023, deadly flash floods struck the country. Meanwhile, other parts experienced droughts. Late the same year, a series of major earthquakes hit the western part of Afghanistan, killing about 1,500 people and leaving hundreds of thousands more without shelter, basic healthcare, and access to clean water. To make matters worse, last winter was particularly cold in Afghanistan.

Terrorism has also increased in Afghanistan. The Trump administration’s stated that the group would take steps to “prevent any group or individual, including [al-Qaeda], from using the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.” Yet the Taliban has done nothing to prevent terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda and the so-called Islamic State Khorasan (IS-K), from growing stronger in Afghanistan.

IS-K has been able to take advantage of the chaos that emerged in some parts of the country when the Afghan state collapsed. It has boosted its recruitment and has conducted a series of high-profile attacks inside the country, usually aimed at the Shia Muslim Hazara community.

Al-Qaeda also benefited from the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan. A recent says that al-Qaeda “remains strategically patient, cooperating with other terrorist groups in Afghanistan and prioritizing its ongoing relationship with the Taliban” and that the terror group’s “cells are operating in multiple Afghan provinces, mainly in the southeast of the country.” The group has in Afghanistan, and Arab fighters are arriving in the country. stated that al-Qaeda’s “leadership reportedly plays an advisory role with the Taliban, and the groups remain close.” Perhaps the most visible example of al-Qaeda’s reemergence in Afghanistan was in July 2022, when killed the group’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in Kabul.

The Taliban’s rule has also affected the broader region. Weapons from Afghanistan are finding their way to the . Al-Qaeda has “sought to establish cooperation with” the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement and Jamaat-e Ansarullah “to intensify activities and strengthen positions within Taliban military structures in the north to conduct joint operations and move the center of terrorist activity to Central Asia.”¹ The Taliban has handed control of the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border to Jamaat-e Ansarullah and has provided the group “with new military vehicles, weaponry, and other equipment.” The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU),² founded in 1999, has well-established links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and operates freely in northern Afghanistan. According to media reports, the IMU, which has both ethnic Uzbek and Tajik factions, during its takeover of Afghanistan in 2021.

How Afghanistan Compounds America’s Border Crisis

Because of America’s porous southern border, Taliban control of Afghanistan has security implications for the US homeland. For example, according to a , “authorities intercepted a large shipment of small arms and light weapons from Afghanistan to South America, destined for narcotics traders.” Weapons from Afghanistan will only strengthen the criminal organizations in Latin America that oversee the drug trade and human trafficking, compounding the threats Americans face from their southern border.

It is well known that IS-K and al-Qaeda have previously recruited, trained, and deployed ethnically Tajik and Uzbek fighters from Afghanistan. In recent years, the number of people from Central Asia crossing America’s southern border has increased. About 1,500 Tajiks have tried crossing the southern border since 2020, including an estimated 500 already this year. To put this into perspective, only crossed in the 14 previous years.

Last year, the Federal Bureau of Investigation caught a smuggling network with connections to the Islamic State trafficking dozens of Uzbeks across the southern border. This all the way to the White House. And earlier this year, eight Tajiks with ties to IS-K were arrested in New York City, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia—all of whom were . It is worth pointing out that Tajiks from IS-K perpetrated the terrorist attack in Moscow in March 2024 that killed 144 people. While the vast majority of Central Asians are likely seeking entry into the US out of desperation for a new life, policymakers cannot ignore the terrorist threat. The Taliban’s track record of supporting terrorist groups makes the situation at the southern border even more concerning.

What Is the NRF?

Soon after the Taliban captured Kabul in August 2021, Ahmad Massoud Jr., son of the late Northern Alliance leader and Soviet resistance fighter Ahmad Shah Massoud, relocated to his family’s ancestral homeland in the Panjshir Valley to begin the NRF. The Panjshir Valley is a predominantly ethnic Tajik region located 60 miles northeast of Kabul and is famous for its ability to resist outside aggression. It is strategically located in Afghanistan, and its unforgiving mountainous terrain and valleys make it easily defensible.

During the 1980s, the Soviet army launched nine different major military operations to capture Panjshir.² Each of them failed. Although the Soviets would often capture much of the main valley and its villages, they always failed to capture the side valleys, which sheltered the resistance. In the 1990s, after the Taliban first swept into Kandahar and Kabul, the main resistance movement also began in the Panjshir Valley. Ahmad Shah Massoud never lived to see the defeat of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda assassinated him in Takhar Province two days before the 9/11 attacks. The younger Ahmad Massoud was only 12 at the time.

Ahmad Massoud has a noteworthy background, and his establishment of the NRF should come as no surprise. He earned degrees from esteemed institutions in the United Kingdom and is a graduate of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Although he did not engage significantly in Afghan politics until 2018, he has dedicated years to developing and expanding a grassroots movement in Panjshir. His efforts are now bearing fruit, bolstered by a wide following thanks to his father’s legacy.

Little is known about the current situation of the NRF in Panjshir in terms of supplies and equipment, and next to nothing is known about the status of their ammunition and weapons stockpiles. While Panjshir has plenty of water thanks to the many streams in the valley, food and other commodities will likely be in short supply until the NRF develops reliable and enduring supply lines that are safe from Taliban attack. The Taliban has encircled the region and has captured large sections of the main valley. According to some estimates, the NRF controls all the side valleys, equal to about of the province. The NRF’s manpower situation is also unknown. Many former Afghan military, police, and special forces fled to Panjshir soon after the Taliban’s takeover, and the total number of NRF fighters is measured in the low thousands. Most NRF fighters are the same Afghans that were trained by, and fought alongside, US and Western forces for the past two decades.

Not only has America failed to support the NRF in any practical way, but the has even said that it does “not support organized violent opposition to the Taliban, and . . . would discourage other powers from doing so as well.” This rebuke of the NRF echoes the Clinton administration’s lack of interest in the Northern Alliance and Ahmad Shah Massoud in the late 1990s. In 1997, Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphel advised Ahmad Shah Massoud to “surrender to the Taliban to bring peace to the country.” Thankfully, Shah Massoud did not follow this advice.

The NRF’s Goals

The NRF’s goals can be divided into three categories: military, diplomatic, and political.

Military

The NRF’s military goal is to grow its grassroots armed resistance across the whole of Afghanistan. In the short term, the NRF will need to maintain its stronghold in the Panjshir Valley while conducting asymmetrical attacks against Taliban targets across the country. In the longer term, the resistance’s goal will be to control some districts outside Panjshir, ultimately building toward a larger base of operations to use against the Taliban similar to the Northern Alliance in the 1990s. The NRF’s limited access to weapons and munitions means that convincing local powerbrokers to defect to the resistance will be a key component of this strategy.

Diplomatic

The NRF’s diplomatic goal is to discourage formal international recognition of the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan by raising awareness in the international community that a credible alternative exists. NRF leadership can accomplish this by expanding the size and scope of the Vienna Process (see below) and maintaining a steady drumbeat of other diplomatic activity. For example, last October, Massoud traveled to France to meet government officials and activists. He then continued to Brussels, where he met with members of the European Parliament. A month later he was invited as a special guest by French President Emmanuel Macron to take part in the Paris Peace Forum. At the event, he was seated next to other heads of state and senior officials. Meanwhile, Ali Maisam Nazary, the NRF’s head of foreign relations, has worked tirelessly across Western capitals to raise awareness of the resistance front.

Political

Politically, Massoud and other senior members of the organization have been quite clear that they are willing to negotiate with the Taliban to form an inclusive government that represents all Afghans. However, the NRF has also made it clear that protections of basic human rights—especially equal rights for women and minorities—are nonnegotiable. While the NRF is largely composed of ethnic Tajiks, the group has stressed that it is open to all Afghans who want to resist the Taliban. The ethnic diversity among the groups that participate in the Vienna Process is a positive sign. It is also worth noting that Ismail Khan, the former resistance fighter and governor of Herat, left Iran for the first time since fleeing from the Taliban in 2021 when he traveled to Tajikistan in November 2023. During Khan’s visit to Tajikistan, he met with Massoud and Emomali Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan. Khan’s visit demonstrates a growing alliance between northern and western Afghans against the Taliban.

A Dual-Track Approach

In order to achieve these goals, the NRF takes a dual-track approach.

The Military Track

Ahmad Massoud is the head of both the military and political councils of the NRF.⁴The head of the NRF’s military committee is former Chief of Staff of the Afghan National Army General Qadam Shah Shahim. Since the Taliban takeover in August 2021, thousands of former members of the Afghan army, special forces, and police have made their way to Panjshir to join the opposition effort. After fending off an early Taliban offensive in the fall of 2021 and surviving its first winter in the side valleys of Panjshir, the NRF launched a modest but effective offensive in spring 2022. By then, the group had started to carry out ambushes and limited attacks against Taliban forces in provinces near Panjshir and the predominantly ethnically Tajik regions of northeastern Afghanistan. The scope of the NRF’s attacks has since expanded to include most of Afghanistan.

In the spring and summer of 2023 and 2024, not a week went by without the NRF attacking Taliban positions somewhere in the country. A count of social media posts shows that the front launched almost 200 attacks in the first half of 2024. There have even been several attacks in 2024 on Taliban targets in Herat Province, hundreds of miles from the NRF’s typical area of operations in northern Afghanistan. The group has also hit targets in the heart of Kabul, which is considered to be the Taliban’s sanctuary. In total, the NRF has attacked Taliban targets in 20 Afghan provinces including Panjshir, Baghlan, Parwan, Kapisa, Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunar, Kunduz, Kabul, Laghman, Nangarhar, Nuristan, Samangan, Balkh, Badghis, Ghor, Herat, Farah, Nimroz, and Sar-i-Pul (see map 1).

Map 1. National Resistance Front Attacks against the Taliban since September 2021

Source: Author’s research.

The NRF is mindful of its limited military capabilities. After all, the Taliban inherited billions of dollars’ worth of US military hardware, including rifles, armored vehicles, night-vision devices, and even helicopters. Meanwhile, the NRF gets no outside military support and relies on existing arms stockpiles or the purchase of weapons from corrupt Taliban officials. Therefore, while the group is continuously looking for opportunities to attack and weaken the Taliban, its efforts will remain limited until international partners provide some level of military support.

The Diplomatic Track

The NRF is pursuing significant diplomatic goals through the Vienna Process for a Democratic Afghanistan. The Vienna Process offers a way for disparate anti-Taliban groups to meet and, when appropriate, coordinate and align their efforts. The Vienna Process serves as an alternative to the Taliban-dominated UN talks in Doha, Qatar. So far there have been four meetings of the Vienna Process with more planned for the future.

• First round, September 2022. The first Vienna Process meeting took place one year after the Taliban regained power. More than 30 participants, representing various minority and ethnic groups in Afghanistan, joined the gathering. The diverse members of this group agreed to issue a joint statement outlining their belief that the status quo under the Taliban is not acceptable for Afghanistan. The most notable outcome of this first meeting was that Massoud became the de facto leader of the anti-Taliban resistance.
• Second round, April 2023. The second gathering in Vienna attracted an even more diverse group of participants, including activists from many backgrounds, ethnic groups, and religious affiliations. Although Massoud and the NRF were the conference’s center of gravity, the National Resistance Council for the Salvation of Afghanistan (also known as the Ankara Coalition) played an important role.⁵ In addition, leaders and representatives of the Hazara and Uzbek minorities were present at the conference. Almost half the participants were women. This time, the to “support all forms of resistance against the Taliban, including armed resistance.” This is a step further than the first round of Vienna talks.
• Third round, December 2023. This time more than 50 representatives from different anti-Taliban groups gathered in Vienna. Many senior figures in the anti-Taliban movement participated for the first time. The notorious Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek Afghan commander and longtime Afghan powerbroker, sent a personal representative to deliver his message to the attendees. Also for the first time, the Vienna Process hosted international observers from the US and Europe.
• Fourth round, June 2024. At the most recent meeting in Vienna, the number of political and civil society groups in attendance increased to 70. Important first-time participants included ethnically Hazara former member of parliament Mohammadi Muhaqeq, former vice president of Afghanistan Yunus Qanuni, and Anarkali Hunaryar, an Afghan Sikh, participated in person.⁶ Parwana Ibrahimkhel, a prominent women’s rights activist who was arrested by the Taliban in January 2022 and imprisoned for four months, also took part in the meeting. To formulate a path forward for the process, the participants deliberated in four groups: political, foreign policy, human rights, and economics.

Supporting the NRF Is in America’s Interest

The Biden administration’s policy toward the NRF has lacked strategic foresight. Whether or not policymakers acknowledge it, Afghanistan will remain an important part of America’s foreign policy for the foreseeable future. Below are four reasons the US should engage with the NRF.

• Improving counterterrorism efforts. The Taliban’s assurances that it would keep out transnational terrorist organizations have proven hollow. Al-Qaeda is more active in Afghanistan than it has been since the 1990s, and IS-K has also taken advantage of the chaotic situation to grow its movement. The worsening terrorism situation in Afghanistan, combined with America’s inability to secure its southern border, means that it is only a matter of time before there is another major terrorist attack against the US homeland. While support for the NRF is not a silver bullet, having a local partner would help America meet its counterterrorism objectives in Afghanistan.
• Following through on moral commitments. The events of summer 2021 damaged America’s national prestige and honor. The US forces’ rapid withdrawal from Afghanistan placed many of America’s former Afghan allies and partners in deadly situations. Sensing American weakness, America’s adversaries were willing to test US resolve in ways that were previously very unlikely. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine occurred roughly six months after the US withdrew. Meanwhile, many of America’s allies and partners were questioning Washington’s commitment to their countries. Supporting the NRF is a step in the right direction for the US to restore its image in the region.
• Protecting America’s geopolitical interests. Afghanistan is at the heart of the Eurasian landmass and has served as an important geopolitical crossroads for centuries. The country borders Iran and China, two major US adversaries. To the south, Afghanistan shares a complicated and porous border with Pakistan in a region that accounts for a sizeable number of transnational terrorist organizations. And to the north, Afghanistan borders Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan—nations where Russia is trying to increase its influence. It is in America’s interest to have a regional partner to engage with. Afghanistan’s location makes it ideal for this purpose.
• Heeding historical lessons. History shows that Afghanistan is too important to ignore. Since the early nineteenth century, there have been 19 instances of American or European intervention—a rough average of once every 10 years (see appendix). Nobody expects that American troops will return to Afghanistan anytime soon. But nobody expected a US military intervention into Afghanistan in August 2001 either. If unforeseen circumstances require the US to return to the region, it would be useful to have a morally and strategically aligned local partner. Thus, a relationship with the NRF is a good insurance policy for the US.

Figure 1. Foreign Interventions in Afghanistan

Source: Author’s research.

Recommendations

The Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan, which the Biden administration’s policies enabled, gravely harmed America’s interests. The National Resistance Front faces a desperate situation against a determined and emboldened enemy. The NRF also feels abandoned by the international community, especially the US. Washington is left with few good options, but the next administration has a chance to begin a course correction. Below are 12 specific policy recommendations to put America’s Afghanistan policy back on track.

• Establish contact with the NRF’s political office. The US government needs to establish formal contacts with Tajikistan-based members of the NRF to learn more about the group, its goals, and its needs. To do this, US Central Command (CENTCOM) could assign a liaison officer to the NRF based out of the US embassy in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. If Washington is comfortable engaging with the Taliban, there is no reason it cannot do the same with the NRF.
• Consider moving America’s diplomatic mission to Afghanistan from Qatar to Tajikistan. In the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover in 2021, the US relocated its diplomatic presence from Kabul to Doha, Qatar. This was a Taliban-centric move that does not align with America’s long-term interests in Afghanistan and the rest of Central Asia. The US should consult Tajikistan about the possibility of relocating the diplomatic mission to Dushanbe. This would put American diplomats closer to Afghanistan and the NRF. At a minimum, the US should consider opening a second diplomatic mission to Afghanistan in Dushanbe while maintaining the existing one in Doha.
• Send senior-level officials to the next Vienna Process meeting. At previous Vienna Process meetings, a representative from the US embassy to Austria attended. At the next meeting, the US chargé d’affaires for Afghanistan, Karen Decker, and the US special representative for Afghanistan, Thomas West, should attend as observers. If these diplomats are willing to meet with Taliban authorities, then there should be nothing stopping US officials from meeting with senior members of different opposition and civil society groups.
• Send a congressional delegation to the next Vienna Process meeting. Members of Congress have been some of the strongest critics of America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. In recent years, the legislative branch has wielded tremendous influence over American foreign policy. A bipartisan congressional delegation should attend the next Vienna Process meeting to better inform the debate about Afghanistan on Capitol Hill.
• Advocate for the NRF on the global stage. In the 1990s the US recognized the Northern Alliance, the predecessor to the NRF, as the legitimate opposition to the Taliban regime. This included diplomatic support and efforts to highlight the Northern Alliance’s cause in international forums. The US should now do the same for the NRF and work with other countries and international organizations to provide political backing to the group.
• Invite Ahmad Massoud to Washington. Ahmad Massoud is an inspirational leader for millions of Afghans who may otherwise have lost hope after the Taliban’s takeover. US policymakers and the American public would benefit from hearing Massoud’s message and the story of the NRF’s resistance against the Taliban.
• Refuse to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. The Taliban would benefit from international legitimacy, and the US should do everything it can to prevent the group from receiving it. At least 13 members of the Taliban’s so-called government are under some sort of United Nations sanctions. The Taliban’s interior minister, Sirajuddin Haqqani, is a notorious terrorist with a $10 million FBI bounty on his head. This alone makes US recognition of the Taliban unconscionable.
• Supply the NRF with winter weather gear and other nonlethal aid. Providing the NRF with winter weather gear would be a humanitarian act. The NRF needs to survive the winter if it is to ramp up its resistance measures in the spring and summer. Providing this gear would be an uncontroversial way to help the group. It would also help build trust and confidence between the NRF and the US government, which could aid future cooperation. The next administration should also consider providing other nonlethal aid, such as secure communications, night vision, and medical kits.
• Consider lethal support to the NRF. The Biden administration clearly has no appetite to provide weapons to the NRF. However, the next administration should consider covertly doing so. The NRF has survived more than three years of Taliban rule and has proven that it will remain a formidable partner. Alternatively, the US should fund the NRF to allow the group to purchase weapons. The US can easily afford this without slowing support to Ukraine, Israel, or Taiwan.
• Consider ways that the NRF can advance America’s counterterrorism goals in Afghanistan. Even though the NRF is the only credible non-terrorist force inside Afghanistan, neither the US nor its partners have done anything to build a relationship with the group. While America has a very limited number of over-the-horizon strike capabilities in Afghanistan, Washington should explore how the NRF could help with counterterrorism operations on Afghan soil.
• Allocate a percentage of the Central Bank of Afghanistan’s frozen assets to support the NRF. The US currently holds about $7 billion in frozen assets from Afghanistan’s central bank. US policymakers should explore legal ways to divert some of these frozen assets to the NRF’s political office.
• Consult with Tajikistan. Of all the Central Asian states, Tajikistan has been the most critical of the Taliban and is the most sympathetic to the NRF’s cause. In the 1990s, Tajikistan played an important role in supporting the resistance against the Taliban. The US needs to identify Tajikistan’s intentions with the NRF and find common ground for cooperation.

While there is no silver bullet to correct the Biden administration’s geopolitically costly mistakes in Afghanistan, the above steps would be a good start to restoring order and protecting American interests in the region.

Appendix: Foreign Interventions in Afghanistan

First Herat War (1837–38). The Persian Empire, supported by Russia, sought control over the key city of Herat. This led to British diplomatic and military actions in the region.

First Anglo-Afghan War (1839–42). British forces invaded Afghanistan to install a favorable ruler and counter Russian influence.

Second Herat War (1856). Persia attempted to expand its influence in the region only for British pressure to force a withdrawal.

Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–80). A renewed British military action aimed to assert control and counter Russian threats.

The Panjdeh Incident (1885). Russian forces seized the Panjdeh Oasis (then in Afghanistan but in modern-day Turkmenistan), leading to a diplomatic crisis with Britain.

Niedermayer–Hentig Expedition (1915). Germany attempted and failed to coerce Afghanistan to join the Central Powers in World War I.

Third Anglo-Afghan War (1919). Afghanistan reclaimed its full independence from British control.

Kabul Airlift (1928–29). British and Indian troops evacuated foreigners during a rebellion.

First Red Army Intervention in Afghanistan (1929). The Soviet Union provided military and political support to one of the factions of an Afghan civil war.

Second Red Army Intervention in Afghanistan (1930). A more direct military intervention to support the Afghan government of Nadir Shah.

Afghan Tribal Revolts (1944–47). The United Kingdom’s Royal Air Force conducted air operations to support the Afghan government in suppressing tribal revolts.

US Development and Foreign Aid Interventions (1950s–60s). The US initiated large-scale aid economic and infrastructure support programs to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan.

Soviet-Afghan War (1979–89). The Soviet Union staged a major invasion to support a communist government in Afghanistan.

Operation Cyclone (1979–89). The US supported the mujahideen against the Soviet Union.

British Support to Mujahideen (1979–89). The UK also supported the mujahideen against the Soviet Union.

US Cruise Missile Attack (1998). The US targeted al-Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan in response to terrorist attacks on US embassies.

US-Led Invasion of Afghanistan (2001–21). A major military operation following the September 11 attacks, with a major focus on dismantling al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban. This resulted in America’s withdrawal and the return of the Taliban to power.

NATO Intervention (2003–21). Aimed at stabilizing the country and building Afghan security forces.

Killing of the Leader of al-Qaeda (2022). Despite promises from the Taliban, Ayman al-Zawahiri was in Kabul, where he was killed in a US drone strike.