On October 20, Prabowo Subianto will be sworn in as Indonesia’s president alongside his vice presidential running mate, Gibran Rakabuming. Since both are children of previous presidents, their election may herald a return to Indonesia’s tradition of dynastic politics.
Following its declaration of independence in 1945 until 1998 Indonesia had only two rulers, Sukarno and Suharto. Sukarno headed the independence movement and remained in office until he was forced to resign in 1967, following an abortive 1965 coup. Then General Suharto replaced Sukarno as president, following his role in repressing that coup. Eventually, Suharto was himself forced to resign following widespread riots in the wake of the 1998 international financial crisis, which hit Indonesia particularly hard.
The political vacuum left following this long period of stasis led to a rapid succession of presidents. First was former Suharto’s erstwhile vice president, BJ Habibi, whose reforms are still often underestimated. Then there was Abdurrahman Wahid, the longtime head of the country’s largest Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama, who pushed for an open and religiously free society but, like many people skilled in the religious sphere, failed to navigate the wilder currents of Indonesian politics. Wahid was followed by Megawati Sukarnoputri, who had honed many political skills as the eldest of Sukarno’s daughters.
Eventually, this rapid succession of presidents was ended by the election and re-election of another former general drawn from elite circles, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who ruled from 2004 to 2014.
This circulation of elites appeared to end in 2014 with the election of Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi. He had established a furniture export business, been elected mayor of Solo in Central Java, ran successfully for governor of the capital, Jakarta, and used this as a springboard to the presidency. Inter alia a heavy metal enthusiast, Jokowi was the first president from outside Indonesia’s established circles and there were high expectations for his tenure. He focused on economic policy and his tenure has generally been marked by stability and growth.
The very real change in this period should not be underestimated. The economy has grown and Jokowi’s two election victories over Prabowo, yet another former general, were generally free and fair. He appeared as a new entrant and outsider to the highest levels of political office, one who could open up the political system.
This quarter-century following Suharto’s 1998 resignation has been dubbed the Era Reformasi – a time of change, renewal, and democratization following over a half century of authoritarian rigidity.
But the major problem of Jokowi’s presidency has been his leaving of it. He was term-limited but in his last year in office several groups pushed to allow him a third term. Jokowi played no public part in this, but there are suspicions that he supported these efforts. Then, while there was comparatively little electoral chicanery, he flouted the Indonesian custom that a president should stay out of his successor’s election. Despite their history as political opponents, Jokowi had appointed Prabowo his minister of defense after his re-election in 2019, and in the last year they formed an implicit electoral alliance.
Especially troubling were Jokowi’s maneuvers to advance Gibran Rakabuming, his oldest son and successor as mayor of Solo. The Indonesian constitution requires that candidates for president or vice president must be 40 years old and Gibran was only 36. But, in October 2023, the Constitutional Court held that there could be an exception for candidates who had won “a general election, including a regional leader election.” This could, for example, include having won an election to become mayor of Solo. One does not have to be unduly conspiratorial to notice that the verdict was issued by Chief Justice Anwar Usman, who is both Jokowi’s brother-in-law and Gibran’s uncle.
That these ploys were dynastic in intention was confirmed when Gibran was selected as a vice presidential running mate by Prabowo himself. Many believe Jokowi had made a pact with Prabowo to support him if the latter reciprocated by continuing his policies and advancing his family’s political careers. As a still popular president, Jokowi’s implicit support is one reason that Prabowo and Gibran easily won the February 14 election.
The current situation has some disturbing parallels to pre-1998 Indonesia. Prabowo was Suharto’s son-in-law and, though divorced, this smoothed his way into Indonesia’s elite. In Suharto’s final years he was the special forces commander principally responsible for the heavy-handed repression of democracy activists. Because of this, he was banned from the United States and dishonorably discharged from the military.
More recently, Prabowo has and suggested that senior leaders countrywide should instead be chosen by the parliament, in which he will likely have a strong majority, which would be a formula for autocracy.
Meanwhile, the head of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the largest party in the House of Representatives, and thus perhaps the most powerful member of the legislature, is former President Megawati, Sukarno’s eldest daughter.
Hence, arguably, the two most powerful political figures in Indonesia come once more from the families of Sukarno and Suharto and they are .
In addition, Jokowi’s son is about to become Prabowo’s vice president and heir apparent. Hence, despite previous hopes, Jokowi appears not to have displaced the traditional elites but merely now to have joined them.
This dynasty can create problems beyond Indonesia itself, especially in the volatile area of the South China Sea. While, due to its internal complexities, Indonesia has so far underplayed a role on the world stage, it is by population the world’s fourth largest country, the third largest democracy, and the seventh largest economy in purchasing power parity, not to mention being the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. As the latter, it has shown that . But this example might be undercut since authoritarianism .
But while caution is merited, a return to pre-Reformasi norms is not a given. As the last quarter century has shown, Indonesia has many and robust democratic resources. Its neighbors and allies need to support them.
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