Below, 91ĆŢÓŃ Senior Fellow Can KasapoÄźlu offers an analysis of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and details why war against Tehran’s Lebanese proxy would be an uphill battle for Israel.
Introduction
Tensions have escalated between Israel and Hezbollah in the wake of Hezbollah’s July 27 rocket attack on the Israeli town of Majdal Shams, which claimed the lives of . The Israel Defense Forces responded to that attack with retaliatory strikes on high-value Hezbollah targets, including , near Beirut. Hours later, Ismail Haniyeh, the political head of Hamas, was assassinated in the heart of Tehran. Iran immediately blamed Israel for the operation. These assassinations have greatly increased the likelihood of a major attack on Israel by Iran and Hezbollah, possibly in concert with other members of Iran’s “Resistance Axis,” including the Houthis of Yemen and militias in Iraq and Syria.
In short, Iran and Israel are closer to a full-scale war than at any time since October 7. If such a conflict erupts, Israel will face one of the most troublesome military challenges in its history. Hezbollah is the greatest single threat that Israel faces from among Iran’s Resistance Axis proxies. With that in mind, this survey focuses on the specific capabilities that Hezbollah possesses and explains why they present a particularly thorny challenge.
This report will analyze four dimensions of Hezbollah’s capabilities: its missile and rocket arsenal, its aptitude in drone warfare, its anti-tank deterrent, and its air defenses. Each of these capabilities alone would prove very dangerous in a large-scale conflict. Together, they are truly formidable. Even if Iran does not join the conflict directly, Hezbollah’s potent capabilities make it highly unlikely that Israel could achieve an undisputed military victory.
Hezbollah’s Critical Military Capabilities
1. Missile and Heavy Rocket Arsenal
Tehran has provided its most important proxy, Hezbollah, with asymmetric military capabilities centered on an arsenal of terror. Hezbollah’s rocket and missile arsenal can unleash sustained long-range strikes against Israel’s critical national infrastructure, from Ashkelon to Kiryat Shmona and all points in between. In its 2006 war with Israel, Hezbollah fired an average of 130 rockets per day . At the time, this tempo depleted only one-third of its stocks. Today, Hezbollah’s arsenal is over 10 times . The militia fields an enormous complement of heavy rockets and tactical ballistic missiles which, in massive salvos backed by drone warfare assets, could easily saturateIsrael’s air defenses. In 2006, 15,000 missiles and rockets. In the subsequent decade, it grew this arsenal to over . In 2019, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) that Hezbollah possessed 150,000 of these weapons.
are among the most consequential of the group’s missile options. A short-range, road-mobile, solid-fueled system, the Fateh-110 possesses a range of between 120 and 200 miles and a 1,110-pound warhead. It is also more accurate than most Iranian ballistic missiles.
Hezbollah’s Scud-baseline ballistic missile derivatives, transferred from the Assad regime in Syria, are also notable. While these weapons carry highly destructive warheads, they possess a poor circular error probable (CEP), a measure of a ballistic missile system’s precision. Therefore, they are better employed as area weapons than precision strike assets and could prove highly dangerous against densely populated areas and large military bases. Hezbollah could strike targets up to 430 miles away with .
The Burkan family of heavy rockets, a new addition to Hezbollah’s arsenal, is a potent asset in land warfare. Carrying half-ton , these rockets can devastate buildings and combat formations. Hezbollah also operates many 107mm-class, 122mm-class, 220mm-class, 302mm-class, and 333mm-class that it can deliver in rapid salvos. In 2006, Hezbollah’s missile forces did not use long-range fires to support ground warfare formations’ movements. In Syria, however, Hezbollah fighters often executed maneuver warfare under Russian fire support.
With these munitions, Hezbollah can fight Israel at an operational tempo that allows it to fire thousands of projectiles for many weeks. The militia’s arsenal could overwhelm Israel’s air defense and counter–rocket, artillery, and mortar (C-RAM) systems. Even if Israel were to intercept 90 percent of Hezbollah’s projectiles, hundreds per day would still reach their targets unscathed. This would force Israeli military planners to prioritize certain targets for protection while leaving others vulnerable. It is impossible to imagine a scenario in which Israeli military targets and civilian infrastructure do not suffer significant damage.
In a large-scale strike, Hezbollah would likely emulate the Islamic Revolutionary Guards’ April 13 salvos on Israel’s critical military bases. Israel would be loath to leave these unprotected in war but would also strive to protect important infrastructure, energy and communications nodes, hospitals, food sources, airports, and major ports. Under these constraints, some population centers would be left with fewer active defenses and need to rely on passive defenses such as shelters. This possibility rightly concerns Israeli officials because, as the attack on Majdal Shams demonstrated, the short flight times from Lebanon to Israel do not give civilians adequate time to shelter even if the warning system functions perfectly.
2. Drone Warfare Capabilities
With Iranian assistance, Hezbollah has also built a drone warfare deterrent that is much more sophisticated than what the group possessed in 2006. In mid-June 2024, Hezbollah shared a video, reportedly recorded at the Israeli port of Haifa, showcasing its drones’ ability to penetrate . Hezbollah now operates a sophisticated and vast drone arsenal, and the frequency of the group’s drone attacks against Israel has .
The network’s first drone penetration into Israel occurred in 2004, when it flew a Mirsad-1, a derivative of the Iranian Mohajer family, over Galilee. At the time, Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary general of Hezbollah, threatened Israel, stating that the Mirsad could reach anywhere in the country. Hezbollah drone operators had received training from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on how to fly the platform.
Of Hezbollah’s drones documented by open-source intelligence, the longest-range model is the Ayoub, similar to the Iranian Shahed-129. With a 330-pound explosive payload, maintains an operational range of more than 1,100 miles. In 2012, the same year that Hezbollah flew a drone near the strategic Israeli city of in the Negev Desert, Tehran unveiled its medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) Shahed-129 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). The UAV can fly for 24 hours without cessation, can carry , and can reportedly operate beyond the control range of its ground station thanks to its waypoint-based autopilot capability.
The Shahed-129 baseline has evolved over the last several years. The initial variants had a thin, pencil-shaped fuselage, while newer platforms have a nose-like bulge that them to accommodate a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) antenna or satellite-enabled navigation device.
Hezbollah can complement this loitering munition family with a new kamikaze drone, the Iranian Shahed-101. The group used this munition in July 2024 to strike Kabri, a kibbutz in northern Israel, killing IDF Reserve Sergeant Valeri Chefonov. The DIA of the Shahed-101 in August 2023, revealing that the drone is powered by an electric engine, has a low radar signature, and flies slowly and quietly—all features that make it difficult to intercept. Iran-backed Iraqi Shiite paramilitaries have launched Shahed-101 drones at American bases near Erbil, Iraq.
Perhaps most importantly, Tehran’s involvement in the war in Ukraine has taught Iran’s military planners how to combine drones with missile salvos to overwhelm air defense systems. In a large-scale attack on Israel, Hezbollah is likely to launch drones in advance of its missiles and rockets. The IDF would then have to cast a wide net to account for the launch positions of Hezbollah’s long-range weapons, which the group insidiously deploys near population centers.
3. Anti-Tank and Anti-Ship Missiles
Hezbollah’s massive arsenal of anti-tank guided missiles, which proved devastating against Israeli heavy armor in 2006, remains a significant threat. The group’s has made these tactical missile capabilities widely available across its ranks, significantly increasing the danger they pose. The anti-tank guided missile threat would multiply in urban and sub-urban settings.
Of the 114 IDF personnel killed in action in 2006, 30 were tank . Of some 400 main battle tanks involved in that year’s fighting, 48 took direct hits, 40 were damaged, and 20 saw penetration of their armor. Available writings suggest that Hezbollah destroyed at least five Israeli Merkava tanks.
Since then, Hezbollah has transitioned from a paramilitary group to a fighting force more akin to an army. Anti-armor capabilities that only its elite teams possessed 18 years ago are now widely shared among its fighters. Moreover, top-attack-capable loitering munitions will likely accompany the militia’s anti-armor weapons in the event of large-scale war with Israel.
Hezbollah has also made marked improvements in its anti-ship missile (ASM) arsenal. In 2006, the group’s successful employment of a Chinese C-802 ASM to target an Israeli Sa’ar 5–class corvette, the , shocked many observers. Subsequently copied by Iran and manufactured as the Noor ASM, the Chinese missile has a range of .
Today, Hezbollah can field an even more menacing arsenal of ASMs. According to publicly available writings, the group has received Russian Yakhont (P-800) missiles, most likely via Syria. This missile possesses a range of 160 nautical miles, can elude systems, carries a 440-pound warhead, and is powered by a ramjet. Should Hezbollah pair its Yakhont missiles with loitering munitions in mixed strike packages, as the Houthis have in Yemen, the network could do significant damage to surface vessels.
Although unconfirmed by visual evidence, some sources also suggest that Hezbollah has acquired anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) from Iran. Iran has transferred this critical military capability to its Houthi proxies, and it is possible it has done the same for . The Fateh-110 baseline, which Hezbollah already operates, has a specific ASBM variant, the Khalij Fars, which carries an 840-pound warhead and possesses a of 270 nautical miles, and even longer, with its variants.
While ballistic missiles lack the maneuverability and sea-skimming features of high-end anti-ship cruise missiles, they fly and dive on their targets at high speeds and are therefore difficult to intercept. In a full-scale war with Israel, ASBMs would be a formidable part of Hezbollah’s arsenal.
4. Air Defenses
While Hezbollah’s air defense capabilities are insufficient to make Lebanon’s airspace a nonpermissive environment for the Israeli Air Force, the militia possesses the ability to score some surface-to-air kills. Hezbollah has already launched missiles at manned and has downed several drones, reportedly including . Hezbollah’s air defense deterrent centers around man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) of Iranian and Russian origin—such as the Misagh-1, Misagh-2, SA-16, and SA-18—and short- to mid-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems like the SA-8.
In recent years, Hezbollah’s air defenses have seen dangerous technological improvements. In fall 2023, American intelligence officials concluded that the Wagner private military company was preparing to transfer Pantsir short- to mid-range Hezbollah, an improvement on the group’s Soviet-vintage SAM systems. Moreover, Hezbollah now operates the Iranian . Copied and evolved from the American RIM-66 Standard Missile (SM-1), the Sayyad-2 is compatible with Talaash and Khordad-15 air defenses .
Open-source intelligence indicators also suggest that the group operates loitering munitions, a robust weapon system with a unique design philosophy and mission portfolio. The Houthis have frequently used this munitions baseline against US . The 358 is launched from the ground and employs a solid-fuel rocket booster, which burns out and falls after the munition’s initial ascent. Then, a turbojet that mimics a cruise missile propels the loitering munition into a new flight mode. The weapon, equipped with air inlets along its rear that are molded to its engine segment, lurks in the target area while flying in figure-eight patterns then dives onto its target after detecting it.
These weapons constitute a formidable air defense regime that Hezbollah would undoubtedly employ to considerable effect against Israel.
Possible Scenarios
Joint operations experience alongside the Russian military, the Syrian Arab Army, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and the Wagner private military company have molded Hezbollah into a formidable opponent. And unlike nearly all other Arab militaries, Hezbollah gives some responsibility to junior and mid-rank commanders, providing it a vital flexibility in combat operations.
Hezbollah has deep roots in Lebanon and strong ties to Iran. It has grown so large and well-trained, its supply lines to Syria and Iran are so secure, and its weapons are so dispersed that no likely Israeli military campaign, no matter how aggressive, could eliminate the militia or end its ability to launch attacks across the border. As long as Hezbollah has Iranian support, the organization will exist. Consequently, even a major war will not fully obviate the threat.
With the magnitude of this challenge in mind, below are three basic scenarios that might play out in the coming weeks and months.
1. Large-scale conflict with direct Iran involvement. In this scenario, Iran would unleash several drone and missile barrages—akin to its April 13 strike—while Hezbollah engages in high-tempo combat activity. As demonstrated in the April 13 attack, Israel would not be able to fully defend its territory without a diligent regional coalition effort led by America. If even a tiny proportion of the projectiles in these massive salvos breaches Israel’s air and missile defense network, the results would be devastating. The Yemeni Houthis would also intensify their military activity to overwhelm forward-deployed US combat formations. , which has already committed large units in Gaza, will not eliminate Hezbollah’s critical military capabilities in Lebanon, but will conduct a limited land incursion while simultaneously using its air dominance to destroy as many of the militia’s stockpiles and manufacturing nodes as possible, while also working to degrade its fighting force. Nevertheless, Hezbollah will continue launching thousands of rockets, missiles, and drones at Israel, with hundreds of breaches every day for weeks. At the same time, Israel and Iran will exchange blows. The US will likely step in at some point to de-escalate the conflict. In the end, Hezbollah and Iran might suffer enough from the conflict to accept a prolonged ceasefire. But Hezbollah will keep its critical capabilities, and Iran will not be forced to meaningfully alter the hostile military policy that it runs via its proxies.
2. Limited engagement by Hezbollah with no Iranian involvement. Iran may opt to assemble masses to chant “death to America and death to Israel” on the streets of Tehran with scenes of burning flags, but still take no credible military action. Tehran’s proxies in Iraq can step up their activity alongside the Yemeni Houthis. The latter can, yet again, score hits in Israel. Hezbollah would escalate, albeit cautiously, by boosting its long-range attacks into Israel. A wildcard scenario would be a partially successful Hezbollah attack on a strategic location like Haifa. This would invite destructive large-scale raids by the Israeli Air Force, alongside high-value targeted killings in Lebanon and perhaps Yemen, but no ground incursion into Hezbollah-controlled territory. A direct Iran-Israel showdown would not take place. The region would stay tense as usual but not spiral into a larger war.
3. Iran and Hezbollah de-escalate. This scenario would also involve masses chanting “death to America and death to Israel” in the streets of Tehran and Beirut but no escalation in tangible combat activity. Iran’s proxies in Iraq and the Yemeni Houthis can step up their attacks with no significant escalation from Hezbollah. Israel would not act preventively and refrain from executing a land incursion. Iran would not repeat April 13.
Conclusion
Decisively crippling Hezbollah would require serious and sustained American assistance—something that Israel, in the current political climate, is unlikely to receive. If Hezbollah retains the capacity to regenerate its fighting forces and its arsenal, any military campaign against it would deliver only a temporary respite before conflict flares up again.
Hezbollah’s disruptive, asymmetric military capabilities make it one of the most dangerous actors in the Middle East. The group’s drone assets, missile and rocket arsenal, anti-armor and anti-ship weapons, and advancing air defenses comprise a considerable warfighting capability. The vast experience Hezbollah gained in the Syrian civil war has turned it into a formidable opponent with robust conventional warfare capabilities augmented by innovative concepts of operations. More importantly, Hezbollah and its Iranian puppeteers have learned from Russia’s war in Ukraine: even if the bulk of their drones and missiles are intercepted, the offense-dominant characteristics of drone and missile warfare in mixed strike packages mean that even a modest success ratio can inflict severe damage.
The group not only receives off-the-shelf Iranian drone and missile technology—it has also become a proliferator of these disruptive weapon systems. In the absence of a broad campaign to destroy Tehran’s supply lines into Lebanon and Syria, Hezbollah will continue to grow as an armed entity. An Israeli war in Lebanon would be an unwinnable one. Hezbollah can only be defeated in Iran. But defeating Iran is beyond Israel’s capabilities absent active American involvement. The likelihood of a wider regional conflagration is higher than it has been in decades. Yet given Hezbollah’s formidable military capabilities, a decisive conventional victory by Israel is difficult to imagine.