Jonathan Hessen, Michael Doran, Ezra Cohen, and Joel Rayburn appear on Deep Dive to discuss the implications of Israel’s strike on Iran and the ongoing battlefronts in the war.
Transcript
This transcription is automatically generated and edited lightly for accuracy. Please excuse any errors.
Jonathan Hessen:
Welcome. This is Deep Dive, featuring 91 Institute. I’m Jonathan Hessen, and in today’s edition we’ll focus of course, on the latest developments pertaining to Israel, the United States, Europe, the implications of the strike on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and ongoing battle fronts, both in Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, Yemen, and much more.
To do that, let’s turn right now, first to introduce our panelists to include Dr. Mike Doran, formerly a US National Security Council Senior Director for the Middle East and North Africa Regions. Currently a senior fellow and the director of the Center for Peace and Security in the Middle East at 91 Institute. Next to him, retired Colonel Joel Rayburn, formerly a US Special Envoy for Syria, a Senior Director at the NSC in Washington, and currently a senior fellow at 91 Institute. Also joining us is Mr. Ezra Cohen, formerly a US Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, currently an adjunct fellow at 91 Institute. And last but not least, Brigadier General in Reserve, Dr. Amnon Sofrin, formerly the Chief of Intelligence at Mossad, and a Senior Officer at the IDF Intelligence directorate. It’s great to see you all. And let’s start with you, Dr. Duran, what can you update us with on the latest, with G Focus of course, on the dramatic events that occurred on Saturday early morning?
Dr. Michael Doran:
Well, good morning, Jonathan. It’s great to be here. And I think it’s a very good morning. Israel, of course, carried out for the first time, a very large scale attack on Iran. In my view, I’ll be very interested to hear what our colleagues have to say, but in my view, it was a great success. The Israelis stayed within the red lines that the Biden administration set them, of not attacking oil infrastructure, not attacking nuclear infrastructure, not going after senior leaders in the regime. And even while staying within those really pretty narrow bounds, they managed to achieve some remarkable successes. They took out all of Iran’s air defenses, leaving the country naked in the event of any future attack. And they also focused on taking out the solid fuel ballistic missiles that Iran has. Well, not taking out the missiles, but taking out a critical element in the production chain of those missiles. Of course, Iran still has the stockpiles of those missiles, but it’s going to have trouble now for many, many months to come, making any new ones.
These, of course, were the missiles that Iran used in the last ballistic missile barrage against Israel. This is the most dangerous weapon from the Israeli point of view. So what they have done basically, in my view, is that the Israelis have reestablished escalation dominance. They put the Iranians in a very difficult situation. If the Iranians don’t respond, they look very weak. If they do respond, they have been given a very clear signal from Israel, that Israel will come in and will take away from them things that they even hold more dear than the ballistic missile production capabilities that Israel has destroyed. They’ve also, by the way, just reinforced the fact that they have an incredible intelligence penetration of Iran. If the Ayatollah Khamenei so much as utters an anti-Semitic remark in the privacy of his own bathroom, the Israelis are going to know about it and they’re going to be able to do something in response. So all in all, a very good day, I think.
Jonathan Hessen:
Indeed. While you said that latter point, I saw a grin on Dr. Sofrin’s face, and therefore, let’s move now to Central Israel. Dr. Sofrin a good weekend.
Dr. Amnon Sofrin:
Indeed. A very good one, very successful one. If you look at what happened, first of all, I agree with what Mike said, but we delivered a message to Iran on two dimensions. The first one, that you are very vulnerable now that you don’t have the anti-aircraft batteries no more. You cannot protect and you cannot defend your very critical infrastructures. And we can come every time whenever we like and do whatever we want. That means we cannot take infrastructures of oil, of energy, of gas, or of course, the nuclear facilities in Iran. And they know that they have the ability, because they watch what happens in the Middle East. They saw what happened in Beirut when we bombed the shelter of Nasrallah, which was about 50 meters below the ground, and they gathered and killed him. So we can get as well, to these facilities in Iran, where they develop their nuclear capabilities, and we can do that as well.
We didn’t do it this time, but of course, now it’s more easy for us and more convenient since they don’t have the anti-aircraft defense capabilities. Second, we delivered the message that we will be willing to engage with Iran on any dimension whenever they like, whenever it’s needed. And we don’t give up and we don’t fear anymore to get into Iran. And now they have to calculate how they are they going to respond. That means that they have two options. The first one, is to try to spray back with full power, and that will drag a full attack of Israel on Iran, and of course, more lethal than this one. And the second one is to give some, let’s say, moderate response that will not drag Israel to get into another very big and very hard strike on their facilities.
Jonathan Hessen:
Indeed. Well, Mr. Cohen, I’d like to ask you, since I follow all of you on Twitter, but you provided some update on Twitter the other day that I had the opportunity to follow. Following the strike, you mentioned some lessons that DOD should learn, the Defense Department, with regard to American weapons systems, namely the F-35I, the F-15s that were involved, 16s that were involved and others, and the manner in which they basically overwhelmed the S-300 PMU2 systems that the Iranians have alongside their S-400 radar systems, the most advanced radar systems. And really being able to take out whatever Israel intended to without too much of a difficulty.
Ezra Cohen:
Yes, thanks Jonathan. The S-400 and S-300 technology isn’t just present in Iran, it’s also present in Russia and other US adversaries. The fact that the Israelis were able to defeat this system, not just with the capabilities of the aircraft, but they were also likely using various radar jamming technology and other standoff weapons that have their own countermeasures, they were able to defeat really the most advanced Russian air systems. The fact that they weren’t successful to deny the F-35s operations in Iranian airspace is something that the US government will be looking at very, very closely, especially for our other US contingency planning.
The last thing I’ll just say, I want to respond to one thing Mike said. I totally agree that this was a tactical and operational success. I agree that they were able to eliminate the air defense system, and certainly, that sends a very strong message to Iran, that there really is no part of the country that can’t be touched. But I think on the Iranian side, what they learned, is that Israel is extremely susceptible, even when responding to the largest ballistic missile attack in history, Israel is extremely susceptible to the wills and the coercion of the US government, and that’s something that is of great concern to me.
Jonathan Hessen:
Indeed. Well, Colonel Rayburn your take on this and potentially also, let’s broaden the discussion into how do countries in the region actually observing this very sophisticated aerial attack, realizing that the QME, the power disparity, is of course, very significant at the advantage of Western civilization at large and Israel in particular?
Colonel Joel Rayburn:
Yeah, well, Israel just won an operational victory over the Iranian regime and demonstrated that if it comes to a full-on war between Israel and the Iranian regime, Israel will win that war decisively and probably, pretty quickly. What about everything short of that in the region? The Iranians are involved in political conflicts and actually violent conflicts in some cases in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and in the Palestinian Territories. Now, in light of the reality check that was just issued, the dose of reality that they just issued to the Iranian regime over the weekend. What are the ripple effects from that reality check into these conflicts in these Arab countries, where the Iranian regime has been militarily intervening for quite some time? Will there be a follow-up? What would be needed there is a political strategy and an economic strategy to capitalize on the military gains that have just been established.
Israel cannot do that, except in the Palestinian Territories. It seems pretty clear that Israel can through military means, and the political economic means that it has at its disposal, it can actually force the Iranian regime out of the Palestinian question probably. At least significantly enough to be able to reset the parameters of the Israel Palestinian crisis. But in the other countries, following up on these military gains is something that Israel cannot do. It’s something that the United States, Western allies and Arab allies will have to do. Where is the plan for that? The Biden-Harris administration doesn’t seem to be postured to take advantage of that. It’s not in their inclination. They’re still in a mode of de-escalation, detente, appeasement with the Iranian regime, not following up and capitalizing using the kind of means that they have, economic pressure, international political isolation.
So there’s a vacuum right there. There’s no follow up in those countries. And if there isn’t, then the Iranians and their agents in those countries will get comfortable again, come out from hiding and so on. And then the Arab world will look and say, “Okay, well that reset between Israel and Iran, is limited. It’s conflict just between Israel and Iran.” And things will go on as normal with an Iranian creeping takeover in these other capitals. And that’s something that we have to be cognizant of and whatever is the next US administration really ought to reformulate a policy to address that
Jonathan Hessen:
Dr. Doran, your take on that?
Dr. Michael Doran:
I totally agree with what both Ezra and Joel said. Of course, I too am concerned about the unreadiness, let’s say, of Washington to capitalize on the real advantages that Israel has provided the United States at this moment. But let’s focus for the moment, let’s take today. In my view, I want to take today to just savor how much success there has been. One of the things that happened here over the weekend, is that Israel has, I think effectively removed the Iranian ballistic missile threat, they separated it from the Lebanon theater. Israel now has a freer hand to deal with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and that is the thorniest part.
It’s always been the thorniest part of the Iranian threat to Israel. In Gaza, Israel has defeated Hamas as a military organization. It is yet to defeat it as a political organization. But as Joel said, I think that’s going to happen. The Israelis have the upper hand there. Sooner or later, Hamas as a political organization is going to be crushed in Gaza. Hezbollah, and Lebanon is much harder to defeat, because it has these missiles, drones, ballistic missiles that they can continue to fire Israel. Those are very hard to suppress. Israel needs a lot more time and effort to degrade Hezbollah further. And it’s able to do that now, without having to worry about being subjected to ballistic missile barrages from Iran. So it’s got a further leg up in Lebanon now.
Jonathan Hessen:
General Sofrin, when we’re looking at the proxies, not only in Lebanon, but also Ansar Allah in Yemen, the Houthis, and then we see also Al-Shabaab even in Somalia, we’re seeing an increased orchestrated effort by the Iranians to double down on their influence in Iraq. Something that of course, Colonel Rayburn also mentioned. But ultimately, everything is interconnected and they’re all looking at what the Iranians sustained over the weekend. Are they concerned? And if so, how does that translate into the field?
Dr. Amnon Sofrin:
I’m not sure they’re very concerned. First of all, they saw that Iran is vulnerable. They saw the power and the ability of Israel to strike very fast, very deep, very accurate, not only on Iran, but also at Yemen. Just bear in mind that we attacked twice the Al-Hudaydah, never fought in Yemen. And that’s actually that’s the length and distance from Iran. That means that we have abilities to strike everywhere and anywhere we can and whenever we choose and whenever we like. Now, regarding other proxies, I agree with Mike, but not totally. And I will explain. This means that we managed to fight Hezbollah before without the Iranian interference. The Iranian launched their ballistic missiles, not because of Hezbollah, but as a payback on what happened to Hassan Nasrallah, what happened to their general who was with Nasrallah in the shelter when he was killed, and other events as well. And that was something they prepared in return to what we did to them.
Now, regarding Lebanon, they didn’t interfere directly in what happens in Lebanon. They of course, want to preserve the abilities of Hezbollah and they will try to minimize the damage to Hezbollah, and to try to bring it back to the position it was before this war was launched. On the other hand, the pro-Iranian backed Iranian militias from Iraq under the roof of Hashd al-Shaabi are still launching kamikaze drones into Israel and trying to hit Israel. And they succeeded many times in launching these drones into Israel and they don’t stop. And they didn’t take even one inch so far. Unlike the other proxies, the Houthis will not back because of the fact that we attacked Iran, because they have their own ideology, their own interests. And they will still go on attacking vessels at the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden and will try to hit Israel as well. So I don’t think that the proxies are now paralyzed, because of the fact that we attacked Iran and the Iran is still alive and kicking and they are still in power. And it can still activate all these proxies to do more things to Israel.
Jonathan Hessen:
Thank you. General. Mr. Cohen, the Chinese have invested a couple of years ago, roughly $400 billion over the course of 25 years in vital infrastructure in Iran, to include energy infrastructure, telecommunications and others. Naturally, if the Iranians attack Israel once more, these will be subject to a retaliatory strike potentially in the first wave or in a second. But nonetheless, they are subject to such a reality. And on the other hand of that coin, we also need to keep in mind that some of those solid propellant fuels that Israel has struck, will now frustrate Iran’s ability to fulfill its pledges to the Russians about timely deliveries for Moscow’s war of aggression against Ukraine. So if we look at both theaters, how do those strategic power competition actors recognize potentially their own footprint within this whole constellation?
Ezra Cohen:
Well, first of all, the Chinese are always playing all sides. And we continue to have Chinese investment in Israel, and we continue to have Israeli companies that are working in China. And I actually think the Chinese probably aren’t very concerned about any of the infrastructure they’ve invested in being hit, because the Biden administration was successfully able to get the Israelis not to strike those types of dual-use, I’ll say, targets. So this is really the key point, and I’m not answering your question exactly Jonathan, but we keep saying, “If Iran strikes back, Israel will do this. If that happens. . .” But the reality is the US has shown that it is able to control Israel’s planning and military operations vis-a-vis Iran.
So I’m not actually sure how truly afraid the Iranians are, as long as the Biden and Kamala administration remain in office, because they know they will not allow Israel to take this to the logical next step. So really the key thing I would just put out there, what Israel needs to be worried about right now is how do they contain potential Iranian breakout, that is their ability to develop a weapon between now and January 20th. That really is the key thing, because their ability to do that through kinetic action is going to be limited.
Jonathan Hessen:
Very interesting indeed. Colonel Rayburn, what’s next?
Colonel Joel Rayburn:
Well, look, in the big picture, I want to zoom out even further from what I mentioned before about the Arab world. In the bigger picture, I think what just happened over the weekend is the demonstrated end of the viability or perceived viability of the Iranian regime’s strategic doctrine, which under Ali Khamenei for more than 30 years, has been to invest only almost exclusively in asymmetric capabilities, meaning militias, ballistic missiles, terrorism as their main deterrent, their primary deterrent, their primary defense. So essentially, you have a middle power here, which has not invested at all in its own defense in the post-Iran-Iraq war phase. This is a strategic doctrine they adopted after the Iran-Iraq war. Essentially, it’s a forward defense deterrent, if you will. They want to intervene in the neighboring countries that might be a threat to them, so as to be safe at home, but without then investing in the things you would try to build to defend yourself. A territorial army, an air force, an air and missile defense and a Navy, they have none of those.
They’ve invested almost nothing. I mean, the Air Force that they’re operating is [inaudible 00:20:58] Air Force with some MiGs from the Soviets in the 1980s mixed in. The Israelis demonstrated that they might as well not exist. And so I think it’d be interesting to know if there’s a recalibration that will go on inside the Iranian regime. What has been the Iranian regime’s strategic decision-making? Is this where they expect it to be in October of 2023? Now a little over a year later, since one of their clients on October 7th launched the raid into Israel, and then October 8th Hezbollah under Iranian direction joined that conflict. The denuding of the Iranian regime militarily, is that where they expect it to be right now?
I think they were dreaming big. They thought that they had a window of opportunity to drive the United States out of the region, to neutralize Israel permanently and to then have their way as a hegemon in the region, but without any of the things that a middle-power would normally have to do that with strategically. And that’s failed, because of this reality check of the power disparity. I would think inside a rational regime that would discredit Ali Khamenei and the doctrine that he and the Revolutionary Guards leadership, I think you have to say, for the last three decades have been following. There should be a reset about, “Hey, didn’t we get over our skis here? Aren’t we now in danger if we do escalate an actual existential threat to our regime?” So we’ll see.
Jonathan Hessen:
Indeed. Well, we’re drawing near to the end of the program. I’d like to have each of you having a closing statements with a little bit of intrigue for the week ahead. With that, I would say also, one, what does Iran now do without any air defense capabilities? If one of you could potentially integrate that into the discussion. And with the November 5th elections just around the corner, once somebody is elected, be it Harris or Trump, will that impact according to whoever’s winning. Dr. Doran, we’ll start with you.
Dr. Michael Doran:
So I think that the first thing the Iranians are going to do, is they’re going to go to Moscow and say, “Help us reconstitute some of our air defense systems.” The second thing they’re going to do, is they’re going to go to China and they’re going to say, “Help us rebuild the solid fuel ballistic missile capability that we have lost.” It’ll be very interesting to see how Russia and China respond to that. Let me just ask one other question, and that is with respect to the vacuum that is going to be developing in the region as a result of the, that Joel Rayburn just described, how is Turkey going to read this? And what moves is it going to make? I don’t have answers to that. These are just things we have to watch closely.
Jonathan Hessen:
Mr. Cohen?
Ezra Cohen:
I think the key thing is going to be what steps can Israel take? As I said before, to make sure that Iran does not develop a nuclear weapon before January 20th. And one thing that everybody needs to understand, the second that the Iranians develop a nuclear weapon, not only are the US options going to be significantly constrained, but also Iranian aggression, irregular aggression is going to increase dramatically. And so that’s what we’re facing.
Jonathan Hessen:
General Sofrin?
Dr. Amnon Sofrin:
I think that Iran will try to pay back on Israel on a very moderate and very limited capability to strike back, because they can’t allow themselves to lose face. Second, I don’t think that there will go for nuclear capabilities right now, even though the Revolutionary Guards will apply pressure on Khamenei to go to this way. But he is a very careful man and very experienced man. He won’t go this way. I don’t think that this is, what we call, the event of this attack will drive him to go to nuclear capabilities.
Jonathan Hessen:
Colonel Rayburn?
Colonel Joel Rayburn:
I agree. I agree with General Sofrin. I think it’d be very dangerous for the Iranians to try to race for a demonstrated nuclear capability right now. Also, I’m not sure that they’re actually within that race. They’re certainly naked, and if there were any sign of that, and presumably all of US and Israeli intelligence adhere toward watching for indicators of that. Now if they were to do it, if there was a way for them to do it without being seen, it would be as dangerous as we are saying. But regardless, I think the Iranians probably are not going to make a decision on how to retaliate until they see the outcome of the US election eight days from now.
Jonathan Hessen:
All right, well, this is unfortunately all the time that we have for today. I’d like to immediately thank Brigadier General in Reserve, Dr. Amnon Sofrin, Mr. Ezra Cohen, Colonel Joel Rayburn, and Dr. Mike Doran. It’s always a pleasure. And I’d like to thank all of you at home as well. Until our next edition of Deep Dive featuring 91 Institute from here in Jerusalem, wishing you a good day.
Doran Gavish:
My name is Doron Gavish and my background, 30 years of serving in the Israeli Air Force. My last job was the Commander of the Israeli Air and Missile Defense during the introduction of the Iron Dome to the Defense of Israel. All of this allows me really to be part of the team here in TV7. It is super important to have such a platform. And we talk about the global situation. We talk about Israel and those different angles which are relevant to the discussion.
Eran Lerman:
My name is Eran Lerman. I used to be Deputy National Security Advisor to the government of Israel. I’m currently vice president of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security at Think Tank, and the editor of the Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. For the last few years, I’ve been a regular panelist for TV7, a fantastic opportunity to bring deep and analytical perspectives to the debate over regional affairs, Israeli affairs, international affairs in the company of some of the best minds in Israel.