

The global governance project is not a plot to create a “world government.” There is nothing hidden or conspiratorial about the global governance movement and its goals. The globalists’ objectives are found, not in dusty memoranda of “secret” Bilderberg or Trilateral Commission conferences, but on the websites of the United Nations, the European Union, the American Bar Association, Yale Law School, and the Ford Foundation. They are available to anyone with access to a computer. Roughly these goals would involve the creation of more robust global and transnational institutions, rules, and norms, which would compromise the national sovereignty of nation-states.

A primary goal is the establishment of global legalism—the creation of the “global rule of law” superior to all national law. As the current legal advisor to the U.S. State Department and former Dean of the Yale Law School, Harold Koh, wrote: “The transnationalists believe that U.S. courts can and should use their interpretative powers to promote the development of a global legal system...”² Further, he states that American “courts must play a key role in coordinating U.S. domestic constitutional rules with the rules of foreign and international law, not simply to promote American aims, but to advance the broader development of a well-functioning international judicial system.”³ Legal scholar Edward Whelan notes that since American courts cannot change international and foreign law, but only interpret American law, Koh’s reasoning would logically require changing American constitutional law to conform to global law. Hence, global law would be superior to the U.S. Constitution.

Two concepts are crucial to understanding the global governance project: the theories of the disaggregated nation and the postmodern state

The disaggregated nation-state Transnational theorists argue that with increasing globalization nation-states are “disaggregating.” This means, for example, that distinct parts of the American government and society (judges, environmental officials, human rights activists) pursue their own particular transnational interests often in conflict with other forces in their own nation and with national sovereignty itself. For example, former Obama State Department official Anne Marie Slaughter wrote that across nations “Judges are building a global community of law.”⁴ She argues, “The disaggregation of the state creates opportunities for domestic institutions, particularly courts, to make common cause with their supranational counterparts against their fellow branches of government.”⁵ Indeed, this is what occurred in Britain in 1990, when British judges (Law Lords) ruled against the elected British House of Commons and in favor of the transnational European Court of

Thus, the U.S. leadership class is crucial. The dream of transnationalists (Americans and non-Americans, progressives and pragmatists) is for America to lead the way. America embraces the global governance project as its own; voluntarily agree to "pool" large parts of its sovereignty with others; and demonstrates "leadership" and "engagement" by submitting to supranational global legal regimes. In effect, for the transnationalists, the American caterpillar is transformed into the global butterfly.

The challenge for the globalists is how to sell this to the American people. American transnationalists put forward the argument that expanding global governance is in U.S. interests and consistent with American values in the interdependent world of the twenty-first century. What is needed, they say, is effective U.S. "leadership" to make it happen.

Their argument runs along the following lines: "America may be the predominant power today, but it will not always be so. China and other nations are on the rise and will equal or surpass the United States in the future. Therefore it is in U.S. interests to establish global rules while America is the strongest state. We should get China and others to "buy into" a system of global authority today, so their elites essentially "internalize" the concept of global governance and are practicing it by the time they become more powerful.

In support of this general line of argument, Anne Marie Slaughter declared: "What goes around comes around, and as other nations grow in power, size, and economic weight, their decisions will increasingly affect us. Principles that could constrain us today may well guarantee our freedom tomorrow."¹⁰

Former President Bill Clinton told Strobe Talbott (currently President of the Brookings Institution), "We're not going to be cock of the roost forever, you know." Clinton stated somewhat ambiguously that "We must build a global social system and "a world for our grandchildren to live in where America [is] no longer the sole superpower, for a time when we would have to share the stage."¹¹

Anne Marie Slaughter advocates a "global decision-making process" in which "all nations must have meaningful representation."¹² [Iran is explicitly included].¹³ She writes "If we [Americans] truly believe that all human beings have an equal right to institute governments to protect their rights, then those governments must have the ability to do just that at the global level." Slaughter insists that applying the principle of "meaningful representation" in global decision making is the "right thing to do" and "also the smart thing to do—serving both our ideals and our interests."¹⁴

The argument that global governance promotes American interests and values is deeply flawed on both realist and idealist grounds. Historically, nations act opportunistically, changing when circumstances change, old agreements become obsolete. Even if China (or other rising powers) agreed to cede some sovereignty to global institutions today, what guarantee could the United States have tomorrow that a more powerful China would not change its mind? It is naïve to attempt to establish a stable and peaceful international order on the utopian premise that because the United States agreed to "share" sovereignty when it was the leading power, future world powers will consider such arrangements permanent.

As Charles De Gaulle famously put it "Treaties are like roses and young girls; they last while they last. Pace Anne Ma16(o)]TJ 2

If the forces of global governance are able to establish some form of global authority as they envision it, liberal democracy would be replaced by post-democracy. But, it is highly unlikely that such a utopian vision would succeed on its own terms, particularly since there is little support for "sharing sovereignty" among rising Asian states (China, India) and among other nations such as Russia, Brazil and Turkey. On the other hand, it is entirely possible that globalist ideology and material interests could obtain a critical mass of influence among opinion makers and statesmen in the West (particularly the United States).

If this happens (the globalists achieve ideological hegemony), the result would likely be not the triumph of global governance, but the suicide of liberal democracy, both in the realm of domestic self-government and in the arena of self-defense from undemocratic foes. Thus the global governance project, unable to achieve success on its own terms would essentially disable and disarm the democratic state, internally and externally. The suicide process would proceed slowly, almost imperceptibly, much as the democratic states of Europe gradually, over decades, lost more and more sovereignty to the u(e)-8.38216(e)23.8