

DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT

Applying the Tocqueville Standard

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Westerners have long hoped that our material prosperity and comforts would serve as a model in the Middle East, and that democracy would enthusiastically be embraced there. But the hard work of building the rudiments of self-rule at a working level in those societies—the make-or-break for a true democratic revolution—has taken a backseat to wishful thinking. In the recent Egyptian uprising, when threats, riots, and premonitions of violence persuaded the Egyptian Army to schedule presidential and parliamentary elections in September, the Western media nodded approvingly, but didn't spend much time considering the principles on which political parties are built, what kinds of parties are likely to emerge from Egypt's current state, and whether they will improve Egypt's prospects for individual liberty.

History does not offer much confirmation that quick elections after uprisings actually increase the long-range prospects for political freedom. Shortly after the revolution in France, Edmund Burke noted that free and fair elections were indeed held, but political freedom was soon silenced by the representatives who were elected. Out of political ignorance, inexperi-

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ence, personal profit, or factional interests, elected representatives quickly dismantled the remains of all old social structures, irremediably squandered the public treasury, destroyed industries and laws, and brought on sixty years of recurring revolutions

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The hasty implementation of democratic institutions in an inexperienced political environment is always difficult. Among the challenges Egypt faces as it undertakes the daunting task of creating political freedom is, first, to examine the principles that are fundamental to the nation's political life and, *then*, to encourage the

emergence of parties. Under ideal circumstances, such a process would change the Middle East positively—and far more radically than any coup or uprising. It would light the way for popular rule in the region, increase the chance that governments would protect rather than oppress, improve the status of women, and raise the standard of living. For now, however, such a regional outcome is impossible to see.

One cannot help but wonder what Alexis de Tocqueville would say about Egypt's plight. Perhaps the most astute observer of modern liberal democracy, the French philosopher famously diagnosed the challenges facing America in the early nineteenth century, writing of a lasting tension between liberty and government-assured well-being. He predicted that this disparity would serve as the chief underlying conflict in domestic politics, and the character of our political parties surely proves his point. Tocqueville's two great works, *Democracy in America* and *The Old Regime*

unevenness rapidly facilitated Egypt's revolution but could just as easily help the spread of undemocratic forces, even under the guise of a fair electoral process.

In *The Old Regime and the French Revolution*, Tocqueville observes that it is "quite understandable that when a nation is badly governed it should develop a wish to govern itself." But, he continues,

a desire for independence of this kind, stemming as it does from a specific, removable cause—the evil practices of a despotic government—is bound to be short-lived. Once the circumstances giving rise to it have passed away, it languishes and what at first sight seemed a genuine love of liberty proves to have been merely hatred of a tyrant.

Once the guillotine had finished its work, the French uprising ended in exhaustion and factious satisfaction of private interests. The central administration's power reemerged and expanded to correct the revolution's sanguinary excesses. The popular will approved, but the public good nonetheless suffered. Without genuine political parties to articulate the role of government, a similar fate awaits Egypt.

If Tocqueville were witness to Egypt today, he might warn of an even worse possibility than administrative expansion and its supreme rule—the rise of a new and radical religious power that establishes itself by manipulating public opinion and flattering or threatening the citizenry. In late February, the Muslim Brotherhood articulated a new political program aimed at cultivating its political base. To serve the public good, the Brotherhood intends to sweep the country "clean of the remnants of the former regime." This, the Brotherhood's leaders said, includes not only all those individuals tied to the Mubarak administration, but journalists and middle-class business owners as well. In fact, the Brotherhood's list of enemies is so general that anyone above the poverty line appears to be subject to suspicion and blamed for the country's troubles.

Tocqueville argues that new governments begotten from revolution level civil society as a way of eliminating opposition. In France, with the destruction of political and civil institutions, traditional and moderate social authority could no longer guide public opinion. The revolution

became a battle for the minds of the majority, growing from a mere campaign against aristocracy and hereditary privileges into a full-out propaganda war. And the radicals won. If the Muslim Brotherhood is as good as its word in Egypt, the yet small and unprotected middle class—business owners, property holders, journalists—will be targets for elimination.

To move toward more democratic institutions today, Egypt needs a larger—not a smaller—middle class, with a flourishing civil society composed of property owners with a stake in stability and moderate governance and the freedom to make decisions that will promote more of the same.

Radical religious rule would be especially dangerous in Egypt, since any new party would possess the added strength of an already highly developed administrative bureaucracy—a perfect instrument for increased tyranny.

The fate of the middle class depends on another democratic institution—private property. Middle Eastern autocrats are intimately familiar with the political importance of private property. Their subjects are less so. In free societies, the principle and practice of private property serves two obvious purposes, which current social science largely overlooks.

Secure ownership of private property nurtures and preserves in citizens the belief that they possess something of their own in the world; that

responsibility for acting together for the common good. Secure and rational rights to property ownership lay the groundwork for this essential element in the political psychology of citizenship.

Experience from Cairo's suburbs—where the media reported that during the riots property-owning neighbors worked together to protect each other and themselves—bears this out. The vested interests that private property provides, and the material strength generated from it, are among the few bases on which citizens can organize against administrative tyrannies or radical religious takeovers. Middle Eastern autocrats, by withholding

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property rights, and experienced officials who understand how to make local government work effectively at the grassroots level. The assistance of both is more immediately useful and responsible than lectures on Western values. Military officers from states that acknowledge the importance of elected civilian control over the military and can explain why this is in the interest of both the nation and its armed forces would help increase the chance that Egypt does not revert to dictatorship.

Finally, if these uprisings really were caused, as Tocqueville says, more by hatred of a tyrant than by love of liberty, US foreign policy must learn the subtle difference between the two. American policy is more likely to