One can only be thankful that Russia now claims that in the wake of – the latest enactment under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter putting sanctions on Iran for its defiance of its nonproliferation obligations and a growing list of other legally-binding resolutions – It was a disgrace for Russia to offer the the first place, since at the time it agreed to sell Iran that missile (in 2007) everyone understood that the purpose of this system was to defend Iran’s unlawful nuclear weapons program against possible preemption.
It would, of course, have been an even bigger disgrace for Moscow actually to provide the system, and it was disheartening – to say the least – that Russian officials told the press on June 16 that the S-300 wasn’t covered by Resolution 1929. So I’m certainly glad that
The problem, however, is that the anonymous Russian source for this seemingly reassuring press spin is just blowing smoke. As initial Kremlin statements after Resolution 1929’s passage correctly made clear – and as Russian and American officials are now apparently both trying to obscure – Moscow seems to have carved out its S-300 deal from the arms embargo that is otherwise imposed by the resolution. Let’s look at the details.
Operative paragraph 8 of Resolution 1929 imposes an expanded arms embargo on Iran. Enacted pursuant to the Security CouncilÂ’s authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, this provision says that:
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It sounds pretty good, doesn't it? Paragraph 8 is a legally-binding obligation, and on its face looks quite impressive. But all is not quite what it seems.
Under Resolution 1929, it is thus now illegal to provide Iran with Áªmissiles or missile systems as defined for the purpose of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.´Ï But anyone who reads the RegisterÂ’s definitions – and IÂ’d encourage the NPF reader to consult – will note that they do not cover systems such as the S-300. In the definitions used by the Register, Áªmissiles and missile launchers´Ï includes:
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Note that last bit: the RegisterÂ’s definition expressly Áªdoes not include ground-to-air missiles.´Ï I donÂ’t know about you, but my guess is that Resolution 1929Â’s choice of this definition is not just some weird and unfortunate accident.
Here we have a joke played upon us by whomever crafted the Resolution: the much-vaunted arms embargo that has now been imposed upon Iran carefully carves out an exception for the most significant and proliferation-facilitating conventional arms transfer presently on the horizon. It’s nice, of course, that it is now illegal to give Iran battle tanks and armored personnel carriers, but the transfer about which everyone – including Iran – cared the most was the S-300. How amazing to have exempted it.
The Obama Administration, which negotiated and agreed to the sanctions resolution, clearly realizes this. ´Ï There is no mistaking CrowleyÂ’s careful phrasing in describing MoscowÂ’s decision to exercise discretion, at least for now, in not transferring a weapons system that is not embargoed.
The Obama Administration is understandably eager to make sure we know that Russia does not, at present, choose to provide air defenses for IranÂ’s nuclear weapons program. The White House is also clearly not eager to admit that the Kremlin persuaded it to agree to a resolution that actually permits this. Both of these things are true, however, and both deserve to be borne in mind as we evaluate the likely impact of Resolution 1929 upon IranÂ’s behavior, upon the credibility of the nonproliferation regime, and upon the Obama AdministrationÂ’s reputation for diplomatic competence.