Although the deal between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Wagner Group head Yevgeny Prigozhin succeeded in calling off the latter’s military insurrection, preventing a Russian civil war, and restoring order for now, one thing is certain: This drama is far from over. Putin’s disastrous decision to invade Ukraine has come full circle and set off an unstable power dynamic within Russia. Prigozhin’s quick alleged of two major Russian cities and his warriors’ march on Moscow against virtually no resistance have shown that anything is possible, including Putin’s downfall and civil war.
When it comes to Russia, therefore, nothing can be ruled out. Since the start of the war in Ukraine, many analysts have that policymakers should for post-Putin postwar scenarios for Russia, including civil strife and the country’s disintegration. But it probably took Prigozhin’s march on Moscow for Western policymakers to start thinking seriously about how to prepare for what might come next.
While there are limited options for policymakers to influence the outcome of Russia’s internal turmoil, there are some things that should still be done. First and foremost, U.S. policymakers should not lose focus on Ukraine. Yes, the events unfolding in Russia are historical, but the West has little ability to influence them in any meaningful way. Instead, the top priority for Washington should remain supporting Kyiv’s counteroffensive and helping Ukraine win on the battlefield against Russia. It is in Ukraine where the United States can have the biggest impact on the situation in Russia: A strong, victorious Ukraine is the best bulwark against various scenarios of disorder, violence, or disintegration farther east.
Second, U.S. policymakers should accept that the very real possibility of a Russian civil war does not mean Washington must pick a side. Let the different centers of power inside Russia fight it out. Prigozhin’s near-success is a good reminder that if Putin is ousted, whoever replaces him will likely be just as nationalistic and authoritarian. The West should stop hoping for a supposedly moderate Russian leader who wants peace with his neighbors and reforms at home—and plan accordingly.
The converse is also true: Just because we don’t know who will succeed Putin and how violent the transition will be does not mean that the West has a stake in the Putin regime’s stability. The West should learn from the mistakes it made in the 1990s, when it was reluctant to recognize the independence of new states emerging from the collapsing Soviet Union because of a fear of instability. Instead, Western decision-makers naively hoped for democratic governance and economic reforms in Russia that never materialized.
Finally, it is in the United States’ interest that any domestic strife does not spill across Russia’s borders. This means enhancing bilateral cooperation with various countries across the Eurasian landmass to improve military readiness, border security, law enforcement, and intelligence capabilities. There is an urgent need to step up regional diplomacy: The countries of Central Asia and the South Caucasus will be key to the region’s stability should Russia descend into chaos, and with Moscow’s influence waning, there is also likely to be more of an appetite for cooperation with the United States and the West. Washington should take advantage of this.
Putin might have made a short-term deal with Prigozhin, but the Russian leader now has a long-term problem to preserve his authority. The proverbial blood is now in the water, and the sharks will soon be circling. If there is a collapse of the central government or civil war breaks out—two scenarios made all too apparent by Wagner’s virtually unimpeded march on Moscow—U.S. policymakers need to be prepared. That requires answering some difficult questions now about how to react to various scenarios.
For example, how should the United States best coordinate an international response to the calls for independence or autonomy that will likely emerge across Russia? Russia comprise non-Russian, non-Slavic indigenous peoples with their own cultures and languages, as well as a long history of subjugation and exploitation by Moscow. Some of these areas already have low-level independence movements and even . As Russia descends into disorder, Western policymakers should expect some of these regions to seek safety and stability in independence. The United States needs to work with its partners to coordinate a response to these calls for self-determination in a way that is aligned with U.S. interests and international law.
U.S. policymakers should also start thinking about how internal fighting in Russia could impact the various unresolved conflicts Russia has instigated across the region. It is not only Russia’s war in Ukraine that could be impacted if civil war breaks out. The Russian occupations of Moldova’s region, as well as Georgia’s , could become untenable, providing an opportunity for these countries to restore their territorial sovereignty. If Putin falls, then Belarusian dictator Aleksandr Lukashenko’s grip on his country could weaken. Azerbaijan would also seek to remove the Russian that were placed there in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Any one of these scenarios could be transformative, and none of them should catch the West by surprise.
However, the most difficult issue policymakers must address is how to coordinate an international response to safeguard Russia’s nuclear weapons stockpiles. Unfortunately, the options are limited. Russia has the world’s stockpile of nuclear weapons and substantial and weapons programs, all of which pose catastrophic risk if they get into the wrong hands. The United States should think now about how it will lead efforts to address this issue. For starters, it needs to invest in better detection capabilities at border crossings across the region. Also, on a case-by-case basis, the United States should be prepared to cut pragmatic deals with Russian powerbrokers who might get their hands on these weapons to guarantee their security or transfer out of the country.
How the Wagner rebellion will ultimately impact Putin remains to be seen, but the weekend’s events demonstrated the fragility of the Kremlin’s rule. Russia has already suffered major blows to its economy and military power since its invasion of Ukraine. The last thing Putin needed was a direct challenge to his authority.
Now is not the time to avoid asking difficult questions about Russia’s future. It is high time to prepare for the possibility that Putin will lose his grip on power, a transition might not be peaceful, and that Russia’s borders could look very different on a map in 10 or 20 years. The West needs to recognize the historical magnitude of the political dynamic set off by Putin’s war in Russia and start planning accordingly.