Wars inflict horrendous human costs and transform international politics. The fall of the Axis powers of Germany and Japan in 1945 closed a violent era of empire-building that sowed the seeds of today's world order. Even a declaration of truce today would not alter the long tail effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on European security. Similarly, this brutal, tragic and unnecessary war will reverberate throughout the Indo-Pacific region for years.
How the Ukraine war began, how it is waged, and how it ends will reshape the calculations of national security decision-makers globally. Across the Indian and Pacific oceans, officials will have to recalibrate their security policies to reflect growing geopolitical risk, technological change and economic volatility.
From the moment Moscow opted to try to impose its will on another sovereign state, every member of the United Nations had a clear stake in the outcome of this conflict.
Some observers drew superficial parallels between Russia's campaign to eliminate Ukraine and China's potential seizure of Taiwan. The more apt concern, expressed by then US President Abraham Lincoln in 1860 and quoted by President Joe Biden in Warsaw this week, is that "might makes right".
Allowing Russian President Vladimir Putin to determine another state's territorial integrity unilaterally would create a dangerous precedent favoring autocracy at the expense of democracy. The autocrat besieging Ukrainian cities with indiscriminate rocket attacks is simultaneously dismantling the last vestiges of Russian civil society, putting Kyiv's future on the front lines of the liberal rules-based order.
Even as Russia's military campaign evolves from a war of overthrow to a battle of exhaustion, the conflict will transform Indo-Pacific security in at least three ways. It will hasten the return to geopolitical bipolarity. It also will accelerate a burgeoning arms race and elevate defense policy over economic and political considerations. Finally, it will reinforce the digital-age trend in which information is weaponized.
The Return to Bipolarity
For many years after the fall of the Soviet Union, experts debated what to call the post-Cold War era. The question is close to becoming moot. The unipolar moment gave way to the gradual emergence of multipolarity that is now in danger of being overtaken by the re-emergence of bipolarity, dominated by two opposing camps locked in a potentially existential struggle for supremacy.
Bipolarity is not America's preference for organizing international security. Mr. Biden embraces diversity. But when an unprovoked war threatens the bedrock of global order, he understands the necessity of rallying a mighty coalition to defend the rule of law and make sure aggression does not prevail. The US leader has been careful to do what is possible to aid the Ukrainian right to self-defense while minimizing the risk of direct military conflict between major nuclear powers.
Mr. Biden is hewing neither to a Cold War mentality nor to an "America First" ideology in protecting the UN Charter. Although at times expressing his moral outrage, his policy of restraint aims to help ensure, as Lincoln also advocated, that "right makes might".
Leaders can envision a brighter future and plan for it, but they must first grapple with real-world events. Thus it is with US-China relations which have suffered grievous harm by Beijing's siding with Russia, ready to take their relationship "to a higher level" in the words of Foreign Minister Wang Yi, even in the face of human carnage.
Far from recreating a historic Russian empire, Mr. Putin seems certain to weaken Russia's power and spur China's ascendance to superpower status. The existence of China and the United States as two superpowers in a state of long-term hostility could make the first Cold War seem tame in comparison.
Chinese President Xi Jinping should do more to prevent a fractured global system. Even if he thinks America and democracy are in inexorable decline, he must take stock of the impressive unity Washington helped mobilize in response to Mr. Putin's aggression.
Even if Mr. Xi distrusts US policymakers, the brutal bombardment of Ukraine's cities and the shadow of a broader, possibly nuclear war should bring out China's aversion to instability.
Even if Mr. Xi is determined to complete the unification of Taiwan and the mainland, surely the tenacity and will of Ukrainians fighting to defend their homeland against a superior military force should cool the ardor of anyone who thinks a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would go smoothly.
Withstanding the world's gravitational pull back into bipolarity is not just restraint on the part of Washington and Beijing but also middle powers and other influential voices committed to prosperity and strategic autonomy.
Balancing US-China competition with hedging, agile diplomacy, and multilateralism is likely to achieve new heights of creativity. Non-aligned countries seeking to resist being pulled further into the complete orbit of either of the opposing camps will undoubtedly face increasing discomfort.
If the US has at times browbeaten Asian countries to choose sides, the Biden administration has avoided the hard sell. Consider the muted criticism of India, even though India's abstention from the vote to condemn Russia's invasion at the UN General Assembly counted the same as China's.
The difference is that Washington understands the critical role New Delhi plays as a salutary counterweight in the vast Indian Ocean region. India is likely to be downgrading the value of Russian arms in combat. It is also apt to seek to upgrade advanced weapons and information systems from the US and other democratic countries.
The US, Japan, Australia and India have advanced their Quadrilateral Security Dialogue around a positive, problem-solving agenda, including vaccine delivery, supply chain security, and cooperation on critical technologies. While the war in Ukraine is likely to spur the "Quad" to develop more hard-power elements, the process will evolve only at the speed of a common threat perception.
Hence, it is too soon to say whether the nascent trend towards bipolarity will deepen and rigidify. What is more apparent is that the Ukraine war is lending new weight to the value of defense capacity and information dominance.
The Accelerating Arms Race
February 24, the day Russian troops crossed into Ukraine, scrambled global risk assessments. The invasion dashed the assumption that Russia would limit its maneuvers to coercive diplomacy and reset expectations about how big powers with historical chips on their shoulders might pursue their sense of national grandeur.
Military planners will draw lessons from the Ukraine war long after it ends. What is certain is that the defense implications will be profound.
Regardless of how the Ukraine war unfolds from here, countries purchasing Russian arms and heavy armor are gaining insight into the challenge of waging an offensive war. They are also learning a quick lesson in stout territorial defense and what small units and individual soldiers can do with relatively simple precision-strike weapons.
Conversely, Ukraine's limited military capabilities have left its civilian populace vulnerable to Russian missile and rocket forces. Its shortage of air and missile defenses is all too apparent from the massive urban destruction.
For non-nuclear powers seeking to deter attack, advanced, conventional long-range missiles are indispensable, as an incipient missile race in parts of Asia suggests. Now the Ukraine war will also fuel the demand for fielding asymmetric, integrated defenses to cope with an aggressive neighbor.
For America's treaty allies in Asia, particularly Japan, Australia, and South Korea, there is an extra incentive to move towards greater security integration that amplifies defensive capabilities.
America's regional allies are also likely to seek greater cooperation with one another. The Aukus defense arrangement involving Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will retain broad political support in all three countries. Trilateral cooperation between South Korea, Japan and the United States is likely to strengthen, with newfound support in Seoul.
The prospect of a growing coalition of countries that could thwart Beijing's ambitions is dismaying for Beijing. China could offset this by doing more to contain Russia's war against Ukraine. The region could also see a flurry of Chinese initiatives on military-to-military engagements to send out the message that the expanding People's Liberation Army (PLA) can be a benign and stabilizing influence.
China will also keep pressing its advantage in offering infrastructure financing and construction and other trade, investment and developmental inducements to strengthen partnerships in South-east Asia and with Pacific Island states. A draft framework agreement between the Solomon Islands and China, which could pave the way for PLA access, illustrates how susceptible foreign elites are to co-opting. The Belt and Road Initiative projects could offer China a back door to military basing. The solution, of course, is not military force but better development assistance.
Fear of growing Chinese power will likely lead core US allies to press Washington for deterrence and reassurance. In addition to building up greater independent capacity for wielding credible asymmetric military power and tightening their network of defense partners, states such as Japan, South Korea and Australia will seek new means of deterring war and locking in US security guarantees.
The region is likely to hear more about potential "nuclear sharing" arrangements with Asian allies.
America pulled its last tactical nuclear weapons off the Korean peninsula in 1991 at the end of the Cold War. But the debate about deploying US strategic assets capable of firing nuclear weapons (bombers, aircraft carriers and submarines) is likely to mount in Japan and South Korea. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe has called for Japan to debate "nuclear sharing", and South Korean President-elect Yoon Suk-yeol wants to reinvigorate the US-South Korea Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, which fell out of favor amid diplomacy with Pyongyang, to ensure both allies agree on which weapons might be employed in a crisis.
Russia's firing of hypersonic missiles in Ukraine underscores the limitations of existing missile defenses everywhere. One current effort to rectify that is ongoing US and allied attempts to forge joint multi-domain task forces that bring together long-range precision missiles and cyber, space and electronic warfare capabilities. The hope is that they can help identify, track and defend against even the most advanced hypersonic missiles. So, once again, Russia's assault on Ukraine is spurring the arms race well beyond Europe.
In Asia, the missile race dovetails with the race for dominance in artificial intelligence and other critical emerging technologies.
The Weaponization of Information
The role of information has always been vital to war and peace, but the digital age has given it new ways to make an impact.
Information played a critical role in the run-up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Although the US declassified intelligence to expose Moscow's military plans, that exposure failed to dissuade Mr. Putin and was countered with a disinformation campaign to deflect Russia's true intent.
However, like the boy who cried wolf, Russia now suffers from a credibility problem. The forces that gathered on Ukraine's borders did invade despite protestations that they were engaged in military exercises.
Soon after launching the invasion of Ukraine, Mr. Putin put his nuclear forces on high alert. Now that the Ukrainian troops have slowed the Russian invasion, it is difficult to trust the words of Russian spokesman Dmitry Peskov when he claims, "No one is thinking about... using a nuclear weapon." That's important because Russian military doctrine contemplates using tactical nuclear weapons to prevent losing a conventional war.
Threatening to escalate to de-escalate, Russia retains leverage. Likewise, making others fear a catastrophic nuclear exchange gives Moscow bargaining power. However, when it faces international opprobrium for the devastation it has wrought, Russia reverts to playing the innocent victim.
While Taiwan is an entirely different contingency from Ukraine, the lessons about signaling ambiguity and clarity and the political will to escalate a crisis can apply to any contingency.
In the Indo-Pacific, perhaps where the weaponization of information is most apparent is over dueling narratives and discourse warfare to capture the international debate and shape the course of diplomacy.
China's state media deploys pointed messages to support core interests. So, it is little surprise that Beijing was quick to seize on the spectre of an Indo-Pacific NATO as a rationale for supporting Russia. Vice-Foreign Minister Le Yucheng equated the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy to NATO enlargement, contending that "unchecked, it would bring unimaginable consequences and ultimately push the Asia-Pacific over the edge of an abyss". His words reveal China's fear of encirclement while attempting to quash an anti-China coalition.
The Russian war in Ukraine hardly created information warfare, but it has been on display throughout and will alter Indo-Pacific security relations in the future.
Regional militaries will want the capacity to deceive domestically like Russia and influence globally like Ukraine. As defense spending rises, including whatever the US Congress adds to Mr. Biden's US$813 billion (S$1.1 trillion) budget request, attention will be focused on combating disinformation, collecting and sharing intelligence, and ensuring resilient cyber systems. And between potential adversaries, improving crisis communication and minimizing inadvertent escalation will be more urgent than ever.
The degree and durability of these three trends of bipolarity, arms racing and information warfare will hinge on how the war in Ukraine ends.
A relatively quick cessation of hostilities might limit damage, but either a drawn-out insurgency or vertical escalation to the use of chemical or nuclear weapons would pose incalculable dangers.
For all the many differences between Europe and Asia, the war in Ukraine is a crucible from which a different Asian order may emerge. The energy behind the trio of security trends could gain momentum when the natural internal mechanisms for tempering major-power nationalism and excesses diminish.
Even so, middle and smaller powers also have agency and can influence the course of events. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's tete-a-tete with Mr. Biden at the White House underscores the enduring importance of statecraft. More than touting the US-Singapore Strategic Partnership, PM Lee's visit should help convey the message that the Ukraine war is also Asia's war and that Ukraine's peace may well be Asia's peace.
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