North Korea's claim of enhancing its nuclear weapons program draws attention to the failure of global non proliferation regimes. The real failure however may not be in North Korea but in Pakistan. The presence of U.S. troops on the Korean peninsula and . The tendency of Washington to treat Pakistan with kid gloves leaves it without any sense of being contained.
. Experts will take days to fully analyze whether or not North Korea had the technical capability to undertake a test of that magnitude but . The AQ Khan Network run by the father of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, sold sensitive technology to help North Korea build its program.
. Instead, then military dictator General Pervez Musharraf pardoned AQ Khan in 2004 after the latter gave ""
Khan was removed from his position but there was no accounting for his actions. An official Pakistani pronouncement to the effect that the problem had been addressed was deemed enough. Pakistan insisted the matter was closed and the United States accepted Pakistan's explanation because Washington needed Islamabad's help in the war in Afghanistan.
For decades, the United States has sought to control and curb the global proliferation of nuclear technology. along the lines akin to the 2006 India-US civil nuclear deal. The delusion was this would bring Pakistan within a restraint regime and increase American knowledge about Pakistan's rapidly rising nuclear arsenal.
For the last six decades succeeding American administrations have indulged in the fallacy that more aid and materiel will provide them with greater leverage in Pakistan and that in turn will help them convince Pakistan to change its policies. As .
Right from independence in 1947, . Decades later, India is still the existential threat, instead of the radical jihadis that threaten to break up Pakistan.
Desirous of but unable to achieve conventional military parity with India, Pakistan's security establishment saw nuclear weapons as providing that parity. Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was and remains India centered. Pakistan's nuclear weapons, both for the state and the lay public, are integral to Pakistani national psyche and the needs of a security conscious state obsessed with India.
Over the years many experts, primarily American, have argued for India to accept restraints on its program and sign the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). They assert Pakistan will follow suit thus placing the burden on India to act. However, that is a misconception.
The aim of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program is not deterrence that was achieved decades ago--- it is parity with India. Hence, it is almost impossible for any Pakistani government to accept restraints on their program unless they have achieved the impossible task of parity with India in this sphere as well.
Pakistan built its nuclear weapons program during the 1970s and 1980s while receiving massive American economic and military assistance.
After secretly building its nuclear weapons during the 1980s, in the North Korea was one of the many countries that benefitted from this largesse.
Other countries part of the network were Iran and Libya: the former is now seeking recognition as a nuclear weapons state while the latter agreed to give up its technology in return for removal of international sanctions and aid.
Six decades of interactions with Americans have affirmed the Pakistani military's belief that cosmetic changes or words alone will suffice to convince the U.S., that Pakistan is a serious member of the international community and deserves to be treated as one.
That the fundamentals of Pakistani policy have not changed was demonstrated when in March 2015 an official from
This attempt to reassure the international community that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are in safe hands and will not fall into the hands of the Jihadis differs little from Pakistan's response to the troubling sale of nuclear weapons technology by Dr. A.Q. Khan and his criminal network.
Pakistan's reassurance about the security of its nuclear program ignores the possibility of a military officer with Islamist sympathies rising up the ranks. In that event, an Islamist would have his fingers on the nuclear trigger and could act independent of his institution, just as Dr. Khan single-handedly sold nuclear material and plans to Iran, Libya and North Korea.
There has been no introspection within Pakistan about the presence of a network that violated all international norms and there is little to no discussion globally on this issue either. Pakistan remains unwilling to change the substance of its policy on terrorism and also continues to build its nuclear arsenal even as it succeeds in reassuring the international community that it is ready for a drastic transformation.
Washington could, as before, simply ignore these warning signs and move on with business as usual. Or the next time Pakistan's army chief comes to town instead of being feted he could be asked tough questions on Pakistan's proliferation record.
If global non-proliferation is to be pursued seriously there has to be a way to make nations pay for bad behavior including on world proliferation. Until that is done threats like North Korea's will continue to surface.